Bevat het religieuze discours aanspraken die vergelijkbaar zijn met de aanspraken die in strict cognitieve contexten, zoals wetenschap, gemaakt worden? Is van het spreken over religieuze fenomenen, en van het religieuze spreken, in enige zin een rechtvaardiging mogelijk die men kan vergelijken met de manier waarop wetenschappelijke of alledaagse overtuigingen zich lenen tot rechtvaardiging? Hoe zou zo'n rechtvaardiging er moeten uitzien? De bijdragen in deze bundel cirkelen rond deze vragen. De hefboom wordt echter ook dieper aangezet. Is het element van (...) overtuiging (belief) of geloofsinhoud, dat aanwezig lijkt in de meeste vormen van religiositeit, de grond voor andere aspecten zoals de religieuze praktijk en houdingen? Of zijn andersom de praktijken en (vertrouwvolle) houdingen de grond waarop religieuze overtuigingen eerst kunnen bloeien? Naast werk van Vlaamse auteurs, werden ook vertaalde artikelen opgenomen van D.Z. Philips en Alvin Plantinga. Paul Cortois (1954) is doctor in de wijsbegeerte. Momenteel is hij verbonden aan het Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte (KU Leuven) en aan de Vakgroep Filosofie van de Universiteit Antwerpen (UFSIA). Walter Van Herck (1962) is doctor in de wijsbegeerte. Hij is verbonden aan de Vakgroep Filosofie van de Universiteit Antwerpen (UFSIA) en aan de Karel de Grote-Hogeschool Antwerpen. (shrink)

Several philosophers and psychologists have argued that evidence of moral framing effects shows that many of our moral judgments are unreliable. However, all previous empirical work on moral framing effects has used between-subject experimental designs. We argue that between-subject designs alone do not allow us to accurately estimate the extent of moral framing effects or to properly evaluate the case from framing effects against the reliability of our moral judgments. To do better, we report results of our new within-subject study (...) on four types of moral framing effects, and we discuss the implications of our findings for the reliability of moral judgments. Overall, our results strengthen the evidence from moral framing effects against the reliability of some of our moral judgments. (shrink)

Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three times, (...) 6–8 days apart. In addition to investigating the stability of our participants’ ratings over time, we also explored some potential explanations for instability. To end, we will discuss these and other potential psychological sources of moral stability (or instability) and highlight possible philosophical implications of our findings. (shrink)

Most philosophers assume that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, and most of them hold that this principle is true not only universally but also analytically or conceptually. Some skeptics deny this principle, although they often admit some related one. In this article, we show how new empirical evidence bolsters the skeptics’ arguments. We then defend the skeptical view against some objections to the empirical evidence and to its effect on the traditional principle. In light of the new evidence, we conclude that philosophers (...) should stop unconditionally assuming that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.

Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...) that he is unable to keep, but only when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows that such “ought” judgments correlate with judgments of blame, rather than with judgments of the agent’s ability. Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral “ought” judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral “ought” judgments, such as what someone ought to do to fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” Instead, judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments of obligation. (shrink)

We are happy to present the proceedings of the international symposium on Rationality and Religious Trust which were held at the University of Antwerp in this volume of Bijdragen. Rationality and religious trust is of course a topic that falls within the scope of the epistemology of religion. Contemporary epistemology of religion has been the scene of a vigorous debate about the nature of religious belief, or more precisely about the role of rationality and rational argument with respect to religious (...) belief. What is at stake in the debate, is the very way the concept of belief applies to the religious life. More specifically, the issue is about the place to be reserved for belief within the religious life at large, and again, about the role played especially by rational arguments in holding or not holding those beliefs. (shrink)

Paul Lewis and Walter Gulick summarize and evaluate Mark Micthell’s new book, Michael Polanyi: The Art of Knowing, and Mitchell responds to their comments in this symposium article.

The mechanical view on the human body may be considered as the context in which the highly technological medicine of these days originated. Organ transplantation is certainly one of the most impressive possibilities of this new evolution in medical technology. It exists by the grace of the paradigm of the body as a “Körper” : this paradigm leads to a self-evident acceptance of transplantation medicine in its most brilliant applications. Refinement of surgical techniques, better preservation of organs, the development of (...) more effective immunosuppressives, better procedures for the establishment of brain death criteria and better criteria for the selection and matching of donors and receptors are immanent goals of this type of medicine. Meanwhile the lives of many thousands of patients are saved and these patients even receive the chance for a new life, with much more quality. The ethical reflection on organ transplantation has followed rather rapidly this technical discourse and sounds as a kind of “moral engineering”. This is certainly connected with the upcoming success of “Principlism” , whereby medical decision making is oriented by applying four major principles to medical cases . It is also connected with the ethical approach of utilitarianism, which fits almost perfectly in this technological atmosphere. The authors question this approach and suggest that a more relational understanding of the human body as “Leib” would be a better paradigm for the promotion of solidarity in the context of organ donation and transplantation. Human beings do not only ‘have’ a body, but ‘are’ also their body. The body of the deceased refers to the life of a loved one. Technical procedures surrounding organ removals sometimes hinder the possibility for the family to bereave adequately around their loved one. The authors are convinced that the urging problem of organ shortage is not only caused by lack of solidarity or laziness, but also by the reductionist discourse of transplantation medicine itself. They suggest that we have to find – eventually with the help of poets and writers – an adequate new language to replace the alienating discourse of current transplantation medicine. They see also in communitarianism and personalist care ethics a better ethical approach for touching the peculiar sensitivities of eventual donors and receptors. (shrink)

People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which (...) other people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore, people judge those actions that happened further in the past to be more morally wrong than those that happened more recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they believed that they were very different people than they are now, participants judge their actions to be more morally wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of their pasts when they believed that they were very similar to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in relation to theories about the function of autobiographical memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving the self over time. (shrink)

The shortage of available organs for transplantation, organ tourism and illegal kidney transplantations put the question of paid organ donation and commercialism high on the agenda. Ethicists as J. Radcliffe-Richards and R.Veatch have reopened the debate. Therefore it is necessary and useful to check the main arguments pro and con. The advocates of paid organ donation refer to autonomy and pragmatic considerations. Why not regulate an ineradicable practice? The opponents rely on the dignity and integrity of the human body and (...) on justice. They are afraid of exploitation of the poor. A thorough analysis of the debate reveals that the arguments pro and con are incompatible and that the ethical debate leads nowhere. Furthermore, paid organ donation will stimulate the instrumentalisation and commodification of the human body. It brings about a further medicalisation of society where the wishes of the patient and the ‘cure’ prevails over the ‘care’, prevention of organ failure and scientific research . On the basis of the ethical impasse and especially on the basis of these implicit sociological considerations we make a plea against paid organ donation. Altruistic donation and solidarity must remain the basis of organ transplantation. Solidarity is fed by charity and fraternity , the two great sources of western culture and morality. These also must remain the basic inspiration of medicine in general and of organ transplantation in particular. (shrink)

Is Goodness Without God Good Enough contains a lively debate between William Lane Craig and Paul Kurtz on the relationship between God and ethics, followed by seven new essays that both comment on the debate and advance the broader discussion of this important issue. Written in an accessible style by eminent scholars, this book will appeal to students and academics alike.

Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer general moral principles for people to follow. These moral principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid, offering reliable guides for moral judgment and decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found consistent evidence that agreement with general moral principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with those very principles—relative to participants who recalled events in which other people (...) violated the principles. This shift in agreement was explained, in part, by people’s willingness to excuse their own moral transgressions, but not the transgressions of others. These results have important implications for understanding the roles memory and personal identity in moral judgment. People’s commitment to moral principles may be maintained when they recall others’ past violations, but their commitment may wane when they recall their own violations. (shrink)

: Originally presented during Ethic Rounds at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, this commentary on the case of a patient treated for life-threatening cancer explores the responsibilities of health care providers when addressing the patient's desire to adopt a child.

Presumed consent alone will not solve the organ shortage, but it will create an ethical and legal context that supports organ donation, respects individuals who object to organ donation, relieves families from the burden of decision making, and can save lives.

In the early days of organ transplantation from deceased donors, the surgical team would bring the donor into the operating room with the recipient, the respirator would be stopped, and the team would wait for the donor’s heart to cease beating. This type of organ donation has been defined as donation after cardiac death, also referred to as non-heart-beating donation. These donors were not declared dead using neurological criteria, but rather using conventional cardiorespiratory criteria. In 1959, Mollaret and Goulon coined (...) the term “coma dépassé” for the patients with an irreversible state of coma and apnea. Jean Morelle and Guy Alexandre of the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium, were the first to introduce a set of brain death criteria based on the description of coma dépassé, and carried out, in 1963, the first transplants from a brain dead donor in their country and in the world. (shrink)

Abstract:Vulnerability is an important criterion to assess the ethical justification of the inclusion of participants in research trials. Currently, vulnerability is often understood as an attribute inherent to a participant by nature of a diagnosed condition. Accordingly, a common ethical concern relates to the participant’s decisionmaking capacity and ability to provide free and informed consent. We propose an expanded view of vulnerability that moves beyond a focus on consent and the intrinsic attributes of participants. We offer specific suggestions for how (...) relational aspects and the dynamic features of vulnerability could be more fully captured in current discussions and research practices. (shrink)

Behavior, language, development, identity, and science—all of these phenomena are commonly characterized as 'social' in nature. But what does it mean to be 'social'? Is there any intrinsic 'mark' of the social shared by these phenomena? In the first book to shed light on this foundational question, twelve distinguished philosophers and social scientists from several disciplines debate the mark of the social. Their varied answers will be of interest to sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in the theoretical foundations (...) of the social sciences. (shrink)